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Voorhees of Chicago, Treasurer. Mr. Thomas W. Davis of Wil-
mington continues as a member of the Executive Committee, having
been elected last year for a three-year term. An invitation was ex-
tended to the Executive Committee to hold its winter meeting in
Asheville next February.
The North Carolina delegation chose the following officers: T. C.
Guthrie, Sr., of Charlotte, Vice-President for North Carolina; Alex-
ander B. Andrews of Raleigh, member of General Council for North
Carolina; and T. S. Rollins of Asheville, Henry E. Faison of Clinton,
Kenneth C. Royall of Goldsboro, and Henry M. London of Raleigh,
members of the Local Council.
In addition to the above, the following members of the North
Carolina Bar attended the meeting: J. Crawford Biggs, Raleigh;
J. H. Bridgers, Henderson; Thomas W. Davis, Wilmington; Lincoln
L. Kellogg, Asheville; Charles T. McCormick, Chapel Hill; W. T.
Morgan, Marion; K. Van Winkle, Asheville; R. M. Wells, Asheville;
Vonno L. Gudger, Asheville.
At a recent meeting of the Executive Committee of the North
Carolina Bai Association it was decided to hold the next annual
meeting of the Association at Pinehurst, North Carolina, on May
1, 2 and 3, 1930. At that meeting addresses will be made by Hon.
Wm. D. Mitchell, Attorney-General of the United States, Governor
0. Max Gardner and Hon. Henry Upson Sims, President of the
American Bar Association. Hon. Kenneth C. Royall, of Goldsboro,
was elected to fill out the unexpired term of President T. L. Caudle
whose untimely death occurred September 4, 1929.
NOTES
PAYMENT TO ONE JOINT PAYEE
Dawson & White v. Nat'l. Bank of Greenville, 197 N. C. 499,
150 S. E. 38 (1929), was an "action by the payees to recover of
the drawee bank the amount of a check, payable to their order," which
the drawee-defendant is alleged to have paid, without indorsement, to
some unauthorized person, not the plaintiffs. The court viewing
this erroneous payment as equivalent to a certification of the check,
allowed plaintiffs to recover. It is believed that no useful purpose
is served by treating payment to one not a lawful holder- as an accept-
'The check is said by the statement of facts to have been "presented for
payment by a holder, without the indorsement of the payees." (Italics ours).
NOTES
ance of the check in favor of the rightful owner and, as observed in
a previous comment,2 many leading authorities condemn that view.
But the present appeal presents an additional issue of importance
which will be considered briefly herein.
"Defendants offered evidence which they insist tended to show
that the amount of the check was paid to one of the payees." The
evidence was excluded at trial and this ruling was upheld. If the
plaintiffs had been partners, as the title of the case suggests,3 it would
certainly have been in order for either partner to have received pay-
ment as agent for the firm, and the evidence offered would then have
been proper.4 If, as the record shows, they were not partners, they
were evidently joint payees 5 and the question of whether payment
to one discharges the debt is not so easily answered. At common law
one of two joint creditors could receive payment on an obligation
and give a discharge therefor.6 Proceeding on that theory a few
The word "holder" is here used in a non-technical sense, for unless the person
mentioned was one of the payees or an indorsee he would not be a holder. N.
I. L. §191, Cons. Stat. N. C. 2976.
'7 N. C. L. REv. 191 (1929).
"'Larry Dawson and D. G. White, trading as Dawson and White, v. Nat'l.
Bank of Greenville." The record on appeal (Vol. 5, fall term, 1928) shows that
the plaintiffs were a landlord and tenant disposing of a crop jointly owned.
'Each partner has implied power to collect debts due the firm. Mechem,
Elements of Partnership (2 ed.), §260; Gilmore, Partnership, §102. See
Black Mountain R. R. v. Ocean Ace. and Guar. Co., 175 N. C. 566, 96 S. E. 25(1918).
N. I. L. §8 (4), N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §2989 (4). But not joint
tenants in all respects. Adams, J., in Dozier v. Leary, 196 N. C. 12, 144 S. E.
368 (1928) declared joint payees to be tenants in common.
*Mangrum's Admrs. v. Sims, 4 N. C. (1 Car. L. Repos. 547) 160 (1814),
semble, administrators; Richardson v. Jones, 23 N. C. 296 (1840), semble:
Legrand v.' Baker, 6 T. B. Mon. 235 (Ky. 1827) ; Morrow v. Starke, 4 J. J.
Marsh, 367 (Ky. 1838); Jenkins v. Williams, 191 Ky. 165, 229 S. W. 94, 96
(1921), semble; People v. Keyser, 28 N. Y. 226, 228 (1863), executors; Bowes
v. Seeger, 8 Watts & S. 222 (Pa. 1844), assignees of mortgage in trust;
State v. Rose, 71 Tenn. 531, 534 (1879), semble; Allen v. So. Penn. Oil Co., 72
W. Va., 155, 77 S. E. 905 (1913) ; also Harding v. Parshall, 56 Ill. 219, 226
(1870), payment even after notice by other joint obligee not to pay; Jens
Marie Oil Co. v. Rixse, 72 Okla. 93, 178 Pac. 658 (1919), payment to wife joint
lessor with husband even though title to leased premises was in husband; Bank
of Guntersville v. U. S. Fidel. and Guar. Co., 201 Ala. 19, 75 So. 168, 170
(1917), payment of dividends to one joint owner even though others were minors.
And see Lyman v. Gedney, 114 II. 388, 29 N. E. 282, 286 (1885) ; Musgrave v.
Musgrave, 86 W. Va. 119, 103 S. E. 302, 315 (1920) ; 22 A. and E. Ency. (2
ed.) 524. But payment to a third party authorized by only one of the joint
obligees is not sufficient. Moore v. Bevier, 60 Minn. 240, 62 N. W. 281 (1895).
This resembles the rule of N. I. L. §41, since indorsement of a negotiable
instrument is commonly for collection. And though one joint obligee may dis-
charge the obligation he may not alone maintain a suit upon it. Richardson v.
Jones, supra; Fishell v. Evans, 193 N. C. 660, 137 S. E. 865 (1927), promissory
note; Hatfield v. Cabell County Ct., 75 W. Va. 595, 84 S. E. 335 (1915) ; Henry
v. Mt. Pleasant Twp., 70 Mo. 500 (1879). Cf. Delano v. Jacoby, infra note 7.
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decisions have held likewise as to negotiable instruments. 7 Of course,
the common law rule requiring both of two joint payees to indorse in
order to pass title,8 which was enacted into N. I. L. sec. 41,9 does
not specifically cover the case since an "indorsement" placed on the
instrument in order to obtain payment amounts only to a receipt.1 0
But to decide a negotiable instrument question simply by the appli-
cation of the ordinary rule of contracts is to overlook the very essen-
tials in which the commercial law differs from common law-in this
particular type of case, the fact that commercial paper is constantly
drawn jointly to two payees for the express purpose of preventing
either payee from transferring the instrument or receiving the money
without the concurrence of the other.11 Business convenience de-
mands that a drawee who defends by showing payment direct to one
of two joint payees should go further and show either the indorse-
ment of the other payee or his authorization of the payment as made.
And so, while section 41 concerning indorsements admittedly does
not govern the case of a direct payment without intermediate parties,
t Before N. I. L., Bruce v. Bonney, 12 Gray 107, 111 (Mass. 1858), that
one joint payee in possession of note may either receive payment or indorse;
Wright v. Ware, 58 Ga. 150, 152 (1877), assigning artificial reason that onejoint payee is temporarily agent of the other hence like partner; Delano v.
Jacoby, 96 Cal. 275, 31 Pac. 290 (1892), semble. Since N. I. L. but without
reference to it, Park v. Parker, 216 Mass. 405, 103 N. E. 936 (1914), payment
to survivor; Ethington v. Rigg, 173 Ky. 355, 191 S. W. 98 (1917) semble, in a
case where one of several obligees purported to release a mortgage of record
by signing "R, agent Riggs Heirs," he being himself one of them,-proof of his
agency essential. Since N. I. L. and referring to §41 but declaring it inappli-
cable to case of receiving payment. Dewey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 256
Mass. 281, 152 N. E. 82 (1926).
'Johnson v. Mangum, 65 N. C. 146 (1871), overruling without reference
dictum in Sneed v. Mitchell's Extrs., 2 N. C. 289, 292 (1796) that "the endorse-
ment by one of two joint payees, is good to transfer the whole contents of the
note to an endorser" (sic) ; "Indorsement by one of several joint payees or
indorsees not partners," 38 A. L. R. 801. Cf. Bruce v. Bonney, stpra note 7.
And compare special English rule relating to dividend warrants, 2 Halsbury,
Laws of England 504, note (s).0 N. I. L. §41, N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §3022: "Where an instrument
is payable to the order of two or more payees or indorsees who are not part-
ners, all must indorse unless the one indorsing has authority to indorse for the
others." Virginia-Carolina Joint Stk. Land Bk. v. First & Citz. Nati. Bk. of
Eliz. City, 197 N. C. 526, 150 S. E. 34 (1929), drawer v. drawee; Crahe v. Mer-
cantile T. & S. Bk., 295 Ill. 375, 129 N. E. 120, 12 A. L. R. 92 (1920), joint
payee v. drawee; Kaufman v. State Say. Bk., 151 Mich. 65, 114 N. W. 863(1908), joint payee v. indorsee.
"And according to some authorities such indorsement as a receipt may not
be required by the drawee as a condition to payment. Osborn v. Gheen, 16 D.
C. (5 Mack.) 189 (1886). See Klaus, Identification of Holder and Tender of
Receipt on the Counter-Presentation of Checks (1929) 13 MINN. L. REv. 281.11 See e.g., Virginia-Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank v. Liles, 197 N. C. 413,
149 S. E. 377 (1929).
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the commercial policy which gave rise to that section can only be
perfectly effected and the utility of instruments drawn to joint payees
can only be preserved by a similar policy in both cases.12
The instant case is complicated in some of its aspects by the fact
that the drawee directed the bank to pay his checks as if drawn to
bearer,1 but the present issue is not affected by that fact. And
though the decision on this issue seems to be wholly unsupported by
case authority elsewhere it establishes a desirable precedent.
14
M. S. BREcICENRIDGE.
' Indeed, when it is considered that the drawee is discharged if the funds
actually come into the hands of the one entitled to them even if he did not
indorse at all: Bellv. Murchison Nat. Bk., 196 N. C. 233, 145 S. E. 241 (1928),
7 N. C. L. R. 455, it seems that the provisions of N. I. L. §41 lose all sig-
nificance except in a case where the person holding under the indorsement of
only one joint payee is suing on the instrument. If one joint payee indorsed
alone and sold the instrument to a third person who collected the draft the
debt would be discharged. This is what happened in Dewey v. Metropolitan,
.supra note 7, where the check was "cashed" by one joint payee not at the
counter of the drawee but at another bank. The check, therefore, contrary to
the provision of §41, which the court said had no application, went through
intermediate bands to payment with the genuine indorsement of only one of
the joint payees. If the indorsement by one joint payee were for collection
only the same result would seem to follow even more certainly-although
quaere in Minnesota. See Moore v. Bevier, supra note 6.
i The direction was in writing and was of a sort commonly given to banks
in the tobacco markets -by tobacco buyers who paid farmers by check. The
bank would of course be bound to respect the direction, somewhat as a tele-
graph company would be bound to pay money without identification when so
directed by the transmitter. See W. U. Tel. Co. v. Wells, 50 Fla. 474, 39 So.
838 (1905) and language in Dodge v. Natl. Exch. Bk., 20 Ohio St. 234, 5 Am.
Rep. 648 (1870); Davis v. Lenawee Co. Say. Bk., 53 Mich. 163, 18 N. W. 629
(1884) ; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Bimetallic Bk., 17 Colo. App. 229, 68 Pac. 115
(1902).
If the payee had requested the drawer to so order his bank, it would seem
that he should stand the loss as he would if a bearer check had been issued
him. But a mere custom for the banks to pay all paper without identification
as if drawn to bearer would hardly affect the rights of a payee holding a check
drawn in plain terms to order.
As between drawer and drawee, the bank could of course charge against
the drawer an item wrongfully paid by his express order. See Mackay Tel.-
Cable Co. v. Ft. Worth Nat'l. Bank., 230 S. W. 244 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
And it would seem that the drawer would be liable also for the further obliga-
tion imposed on the bank by the instant case in consequence of the depositor's
act.1Professor Lile in forcibly advocating this view adds the following: "If
the Massachusetts rule be sound, paper payable to two or more payees under
N. I. L. §8 (4), becomes, so far as payment is concerned, impliedly payable to
'one or some of the several payees,' under § 8 (5), thus rendering the latter
subsection useless." He also calls attention to the fact that before the N. I. L.
instruments payable in the alternative were not negotiable while those to joint
payees were, as evidence of a wide difference between those two types. BiGE-
LOW, BILLS, NOTES AND CIRc s, (3d. ed.) §147 n. 5.
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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS
Legislation declaring that proof of one fact shall be presumptive
of an ultimate fact to .be proved is deemed invalid unless there is a
rational connection between the facts proved and those which may
be inferred.' Thus, a Georgia statute2 placing upon a railroad com-
pany the burden of disproving a presumption of negligence 8 raised
upon mere proof of injury caused by the "running of locomotives or
cars" was held by the Supreme Court of the United States uncon-
stitutional because there was no rational connection between the fact
of injury and the negligence inferred therefrom. 4
This same court, in construing a statute creating a presumption
of knowledge of insolvency against bank officials upon proof of re-
ceiving deposits during insolvency, held that a rational connection be-
tween fact proved and fact inferred was unnecessary where the legis-
lature had the power to impose absolute liability upon proof of the
fact raising the presumption.5 Under this ruling, a preliminary test
as to the validity of a presumption would be whether a like rule,
imposing absolute liability, would be invalid. Applying this test to
the Georgia statute,6 the first question would be, whether the legis-
lature had the power to impQse absolute liability upon a railroad for
any injuries caused by the running of its locomotives or cars. That
absolute liability may be imposed under certain conditions is shown
by statutes making railroads absolutely liable for fire communicated
'Manley v. State, 166 Ga. 563, 144 S. E. 170, remd., 49 S. Ct. 215 (1928) ;
McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U. S. 79, 36 S. Ct. 498 (1916) ;
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 55 L. Ed. 191, 31 S. Ct. 145 (1911).
'Ga. Ann. Code (Michie, 1926) §280. "A railroad company shall be liable
for any damage done to persons, stock or other property by the running of
locomotives, or cars, or other machinery of such company, unless the company
shall make it appear that their agents have exercised all ordinary and reason-
able care and diligence, the presumption in all cases being against the company."
'The above statute, supra note 2, is' construed in the following cases,
Western and Atlantic R. R. v. Thompson, 38 Ga. App. $99, 144 S. E. 831(1928); Central of Georgia R. R. v. Barnett, 35 Ga. App. 528, 134 S. E. 126(1926); Ellenberg v. Southern R. R., 5 Ga. App. 389, 63 S. E. 240 (1908).
'Plaintiff's husband was killed when the truck he was driving collided with
the defendants' train at a crossing. The Georgia courts, in conitruing the
statute above, supra note 2, held that the defendant railroad company must
disprove .by a preponderance of evidence every particular in which it was al-
leged to have been negligent. Western and Atl. R. R. v. Henderson, 35 Ga.
App. 353, 133 S. E. 645 (1926), aff'd, 36"Ga. App. 679, 137 S. E. 855 (1927),
aff'd, 167 Ga. 22, 144 S. E. 905 (1928), rev'd, 49 S. Ct. 443, 73 L. Ed. 519
(1929), aff'd, 149 S. E. 101 (1929).
'Ferry v. Ramsay, 277 U. S. 88, 48 S. Ct. 443 (1923) ; cf. Manley v. State,
supra note 1, where a similar statute creating a presumption of criminal intent
was held unconstitutional. See (1929) 7 N. C. L. REv. 62, 453.
'Supra note 2.
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by its engines,7 for injuries to passengers," and for injuries'to third
persons caused by failure to maintain their crossings in safe condi-
tion.9 Whether a legislature has the power to go a step further in
imposing absolute liability upon a railroad seemingly resolves itself
into a question of policy. As contrasted with the foregoing statutes,
the Federal courts' 0 and those of a majority of the states"1 adopt a
policy more favorable toward railroads in imposing the duty to stop,
look, and listen upon persons approaching railroad tracks. This is
based upon the practical considerations that a person can avoid a
train more easily than a train can avoid him, and the expense and
inconvenience of stopping and starting trains. A frequent reason
for imposing absolute liability is that in the particular type of cases,
the class of persons so made liable is the one usually at fault. This
would not be true in the railroad accident cases because the person
injured is as often at fault as the railroad. On the other hand, it
may be argued that due to the danger inherent in operating trains, a
number of accidents occur unavoidably, and that still more occur
through the fault of both parties, and that even where only one party
is to blame, it is often impossible to prove that he is the one at fault.
It may be suggested that society should indirectly bear the burden
of these accidents by making the railroads pay for them in the first
instance,--a burden which the railroads can ultimately shift to the
public by means of their rates.' 2 It seems then fairly arguable that
absolute liability for train accidents might constitutionally be imposed
upon the railroads. The court, however, in the Georgia case, abso-
lutely ignored this phase of the question.
Conceding, however, that a legislature does not have the power
St. Louis and S. F. R. R. v. Matthews, 165 U. S. 1, 41 L. Ed. 611, 17 S. Ct.
243 (1896) ; Anderson v. Minneapolis, etc. R. R. Co., 150 Minn. 530, 185 N.
W. 299 (1921). See 5 WIGmoIF, EViDENCE, (2d. Ed.) §2509, and notes 3 and 4.
'Chicago, etc. R. R. v. Zernecke, 59 Neb. 689, 82 N. W. 26 (1900), aff'd,
183 U. S. 592, 46 L. Ed. 339, 22 S. Ct. 229 (1902). See also (1899), 13 Hxv.
L. REv. 604.
" Talley v. Pittsburg, etc. R. R., 231 Ill. App. 513 (1923) ; Mouson v. Chi-
cago, etc. R. R., 181 Iowa 1354, 159 N. W. 679 (1916).
""When a man goes upon a railroad track he knows that he goes to a
place where he will be killed if a train comes upon him before he is clear of
the track. He knows that he must stop for the train and not the train stop for
him." Baltimore and Ohio R. R. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66, 67, 48 S. Ct. 24
(1922).
' Lutz v. Davis, 195 Iowa 1049, 192 N. W. 15 (1923) ; Castle v. Director
General of the Railroads, 232 N. Y. 430, 134 N. E. 334 (1922) ; Costin v. Tide-
water Power Co., 181 N. C. 196, 106 S. E. 568 (1921).
' See Elsbree and Roberts (1928) Compulsory Inmrance against Motor
Vehicle Accidents, 76 U. oF PA. L. REv. 690.
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to imp6se absolute liability upon railroad companies for all injuries
caused by the running of their trains, it does not necessarily follow
that a legislature should be denied the power to impose the lesser
handicap of a presumption. Thus, a presumption of negligence from
derailment has been held constitutional on the ground that there was
a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact presumed
therefrom.13 But the Court, in holding the Georgia statute14 uncon-
stitutional because its "reasoning does not lead from the occurrence
back to its cause," overlooks the fact that presumptions without such
rational connection have been held constitutional upon the ground
that they were based upon some reason of policy distinct from the
mere probability of the inference. Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
says, "Some rebuttable presumptions have no logical core but rest
upon some policy of that particular 'branch of substantive law with
which they are connected."' 5 For illustration, the presumption that
if goods are handled by several carriers, damage in transit was caused
by the last carrier, is obviously based upon the policy of relieving the
shipper of the initial burden of. investigation and putting it on some
one who has the facilities for doing it. Therefore, granting there is
no basis of probability for the presumption created by the Georgia
statute,16 it should not be held unconstitutional if it is based upon
some reasonable policy. That such a presumption would stimulate
railroads to disclose facts peculiarly within their own knowledge, the
non-disclosure of which would defeat the ends of justice; and, also
' Mobile, etc. R. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 55 L. Ed. 78, 31 S. Ct. 136,
55 L. R. A. (N. S.) 226, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 463 (1910). It has been settled by
the Supreme Court of the United States that a presumption must have a rational
connection between fact proved and fact presumed therefrom, supra note 1.
Thus, a statute raising a presumption of knowledge of actual possession of a
still upon mere proof of finding the still on defendant's land was held valid
because the "existence upon the land of distilling apparatus ...has a natural
relation to the fact that the occupant of the land has knowledge of ...its
existence." Hawes v. State, 258 U. S. 1, 42 S. Ct. 204 (1922). For further
illustration see, Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U. S. 698, 729, 13 S. Ct. 1016(1892); James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U. S. 119, 71 L.
ed. 569 (1926) ; Hawkins v. Bleakley, 243 U. S. 210, 214, 37 S. Ct. 255 (1916) ;
Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, 588, 24 S. Ct. 372 (1903). Contra: 2 WIG-
MoRE, EvnmDcs (2d. ed.) §1354 at page 1672, "If the legislature can make a
rule of evidence at all, it cannot be controlled by a judicial standard of ration-
ality, anymore than its economic fallacies can-be invalidated by the judicial
conceptions of economic truth . . .the legislature is not obliged to obey either
the axioms of rational evidence or the axioms of economic science."
" Supra note 2.
"'Progress of the Law, Evidence (1921), 35 HAiv. L. REv. 302, 311; see
also, Bohen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden
of Proof (1920), 68 U. PA. L. Rrv. 307, 317, 320.
" Supra note 2.
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that their great wealth and power would enable them to disprove
negligence more easily than an individual could prove it, are practical
arguments for such presumptions. It is submitted that it should be
within the exclusive power of the legislature to determine when pub-
lic interest makes necessary a shift in evidential procedure so long as
such change is not merely arbitrary or capricious. 17
The Court also found the Georgia statute' s unconstitutional be-
cause the presumption created by it placed upon the railroad not a
mere duty of proceeding but the burden of disproving every allega-
tion of negligence by a preponderance of the evidence. This statute
was distinguished from a Mississippi statute' 9 held constitutional by
this same Court because the latter merely required that the railroad
company go forward with the evidence.20 So far as we have been
able to find, this is the first time the Supreme Court of the United
States has ever given the shifting of the risk of non-persuasion as a
ground for holding a statutory presumption invalid. On the other
hand, several statutes which shifted the risk of non-persuasion have
been held constitutional. 21
' 2 WiGmoRE- EVIDENCE (2d ed.), §1354 at page 1670, "There is not the
least doubt, on principle, that the legislature has entire control over such rules;
as it has over all other rules of procedure in general, and evidence in particular,
subject only to the limitations expressly enshrined in the Constitution." As to
the constitutional limitations upon rules of evidence, see 1 WiG OP, EVIDENCE(2d ed.), §7. The determination of the constitutionality of a rule of evidence
resolves itself into a balancing of "rights." "Choice must be exercised. The
choice is not, however, capricious, it involves judgment between defined claims,
each of recognized validity, each with a pedigree of its own, but all of which
cannot be satisfied completely." Frankfurter, Constitutional Opinions of Jus-
tice Holmes (1915) 29 HAmv. L. RVv. 636, 686.
Supra note 2.
19 Miss. Ann. Code (Hemmingway, 1927), §1645. "... Proof of injury
inflicted by the running of the locomotives or cars of such company shall be
prima facie evidence of the want of reasonable skill and care on the part of
the servants of the company in reference to such injury." In Mobile etc. R. R.
v. Turnipseed, supra note 13, this statute was held to impose upon the defend-
ant railroad the duty of going forward with the evidence. It should be noted
that the plaintiff in the Georgia case was a third person killed in a crossing
collision, whereas the plaintiff in the Mississippi case was an employee injured
by a derailment.
"The indiscriminate use of the word "presumption" has caused confusion.
It may mean anything from just enough evidence to get to the jury to a con-
clusive presumption. McCormick, Presumptions and Burden of Proof (1927) 5
N. C. L. REv. 291, 307. That the Georgia statute does more than create a true
presumption because it is not the function of a presumption to shift the onus
of proof; see 4 WIGmoaE, EVIDENCE (2d ed.), §2489. That a presumption may,
exceptionally shift the onus of proof, see Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable
Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of Proof, supra note 15.
"Minneapolis M. R. v. Minnesota, 193 U. S. 53, 48 L. ed. 614 (1903) ; Fong
Yue Ting v. U. S., supra note 13; Adams v. New York, supra note 13; Hawes
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The fundamental principle that the plaintiff must prove his case
has been modified both by legislative enactment and judicial decision
to meet the complexities of a changing civilization. Thus, there are
statutes which shift certain portions of the burden of proof from the
plaintiff, upon whom it originally rested, to the defendant. In some
instances, the mere duty of producing evidence has been shifted to
the defendant, in others, the risk of non-persuasion has been imposed,
and in still others, absolute liability has been placed upon the de-
fendant. Also, the courts, by invoking the doctrine of "res ipsa
loquitor," have achieved the same results obtained by legislative enact-
ments.22 Of course it would be logical that where a legislature could
impose absolute liability, it could also impose the lesser burdens of
the risk of non-persuasion and of producing evidence. Likewise, if
the legislature is empowered to shift the duty of proceeding with the
evidence in a particular situation to the defendant, there seems little
reason to deny it the power to impose the heavier burden of the risk
of non-persuasion upon the defendant in a similar situation, as the
effect of shifting the risk of non-persuasion is but to require the de-
fendant, in his defense, to prove a part of the case which was orig-
inally required of the plaintiff. Illustrations of this apportionment
can be found in every case of the so-called "affirmative defenses."
Thus, in defamation, the plaintiff alleges but need not prove the falsity
of the defendant's statements. The defendant must prove "truth."23
So, in an action on a note the plaintiff avers that it is unpaid, but the
defendant must plead and prove payment.2 4 There is no logic in
these apportionments, nor does experience indicate a probability that
notes are unpaid or grave imputations false. The real reason for
shifting this risk of non-persuasion is based upon beliefs as to the
expediency of requiring one party or the other to bear the risk of the
failure to disclose, convincingly, the pertinent facts about the partic-
ular issue.
v. Georgia, supra note 13; Hawkins v. Bleakley, supra note 13; James-Dickin-
son Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, supra note 13. It should be noted that the
Supreme Court of the United States in construing the statutes in the above
cases based their decisions upon the ground that there was probability in the
presumptions created.
'See excellent comment (1923) 12 CAL. L. REv. 138.
"Warner v. Fuller, 245 Mass. 520, 139 N. E. 811 (1923) ; Riley v. Stone,
174 N. C. 588, 94 S. E. 434 (1917).
"Where the plaintiff produces in evidence the defendant's note, uncanceled,
upon which suit was brought, the burden is on the defendant to show that he
had paid it, in order to establish this as a defense. Citizens Bank v. Knox,
187 N. C. 565, 122 S. E. 304 (1924) ; Swan v. Carawan, 168 N. C. 473, 84 S. E.
706 (1915).
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It is probable that the Court will not adhere to its distinction be-
tween presumptions imposing the risk of non-persuasion and those
merely shifting the duty of proceeding with the evidence. If it con-
tinues to require that statutory presumptions be based upon a "ra-
tional connection," it will doubtless extend this same requirement to
statutes shifting the mere duty of going forward with the evidence.2 5
It is hoped, however, that it will do neither, but will adopt the more
liberal attitude of holding every type of statutory presumption valid
where absolute liability could be imposed in the same situation,2 6
and, where absolute liability could not be imposed, of holding a
statutory presumption valid if it is -based either upon a "probable
connection" or some authorized reason of policy.
2 7
J. FRAziER GLENN, JR.
RIsK OF Loss IN BANK COLLECTIONS UNDER NORTH CAROLINA
STATUTE
As an emergency measure, North Carolina, together with a num-
ber of other states, enacted a statute1 permitting a drawee bank to
" A statute making failure to perform labor contracted for without refund-
ing the money paid therefor prima facie evidence of criminal intent was de-
clared unconstitutional although it was construed as meaning just enough
evidence to go to the jury from which they could find for either party. Bailey
v. Alabama, supra note 1. This case seems to indicate the importance placed
upon a probable connection by the Supreme Court of the United States.
" This attitude was adopted by the U. S. Supreme Court in Ferry v. Ramsay,
supra note 5.
' Since the completion of this note, and after the United States Supreme
Court's decision holding the Georgia statute unconstitutional, supra note 4, the
Court of Appeals of Georgia held this same statute constitutional on the ground
that the U. S. Supreme Court had erroneously construed the statute as shifting
the risk of non-persuasion when its proper construction, indicated by a long
line of decisions, merely required the railroad company to proceed with the
evidence. Ga. Ry. and Power Co. v. Shaw, 149 S. E. 657 (Ga., Oct. 1929). The
constitutionality of this decision will be the subject of a comment in a forth-
coming issue of this LAw REv.vW.
It should be noted that the Georgia legislature, immediately after and ap-
parently as a result of the decision in the Henderson case, supra note 4, passed
an act approved August 24, 1929, which creates a presumption of negligence
against a railroad company in the words of the Mississippi statute, held con-
stitutional in Mobile, etc. R. R. v. Turnipseed, supra note 13.
'N. C. Code 1927, §220 (aa) as enacted by N. C. Pub. Laws 1921, Ch. 20,
§2. In order to prevent the accumulation of unnecessary amounts of money in
the vaults of the banks and trust companies chartered by this state, all checks
drawn on said banks and trust companies shall, unless specified on the face
thereof to the contrary by the maker or makers thereof, be payable in ex-
change drawn on the reserve deposits of said banks, when any such check is
presented by or through any Federal Reserve Bank, postoffice or express com-
pany or any respective agent thereof. Held constitutional in Farmers' and
Merchants' Bank of Monroe v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U. S. 649, 43 S. Ct.
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pay by exchange draft an item presented to it for collection, by or
through a Federal Reserve Bank, postoffice or express company,
unless the drawer had specified on the check to the contrary. The
statute, directed only against the practices of the Federal Reserve
Bank during the par-clearance controversy, had the desired effect.2
Since then it has apparently lain dormant until recently, when two
North Carolina cases3 raised the question as to its effect upon the
rights of the payee of a check, (1) against the drawer, (2) against
the collecting bank,4 when a drawee bank in the exercise of the option
granted it, remits in payment of an item, an exchange draft which
is dishonored upon presentation.
(1) As to the payee's rights against the drawer.
It is accepted as a general rule that a check is deemed paid, and
the drawer and indorsers discharged when the item is stamped
"paid" and debited to the drawer's account by the drawee. 5  The
651 (1923), reversing state court decision, 183 N. C. 546, 112 S. E. 252 (1922).
Similar statutes have been enacted in other states: Ala. Gen. & Loc. Acts
(1920), No. 35; Fla. Gen. Laws (1921), Ch. 8532; Ga. Laws (1920), p, 107;
La. Acts (1920), No. 23; Miss. Laws (1920), Ch. 183; S. D. Laws (1921),
Ch. 31; Tenn. Pub. Acts (1921), Ch. 37.
The following statutes permit collecting banks to forward items direct to
the drawee and accept exchange in payment: Cal. Gen. Laws (1925), Ch. 312,
§5; Colo. Laws (1925), Ch. 64, p. 172; Minn. Laws (1927), Ch. 138, §1; Mont.
Laws (1925), Ch. 63, p. 85; Ore. Laws (1925), Ch. 207, §126; S. C. Laws(1927), No. 202, p. 369, having a section giving a preferred claim in the
assets of an insolvent drawee bank; N. D. Laws (1927), Ch. 92 H. B. 249.
' In order to force par clearance upon numerous southern state banks the
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond made a practice of accumulating checks
on those drawees and presenting them over the counter with a demand for cash.
This resulted in a loss of income from collection exchange charges and necessi-
tated keeping large amounts of currency on hand. See C. T. Murchison, Par
Clearance of Checks (1922), I N. C. L. Rav. 133; SPAnit, CLEAnANCE AND
CoLLEciox OF C Ecs (1926), 232, 269 et seq; note (1923) 37 HRv. L. Rxv.
133.
' Morris v. Cleve, 197 N. C. 253, 148 S. E. 256 (1929) suit by holder of a
check against the drawer; Braswell v. Citizens Nat. Bank, 197 N. C. 229, 148
S. E. 236 (1929) suit by holder against the collecting bank.
'For the purposes of clarity, reference in the text to "collecting bank" will
be to the final bank in the chain of collection between the depository bank and
the drawee. Since North Carolina follows the "Massachusetts rule" in regard
to liability of collecting banks, Bank of Rocky Mount v. Floyd, 142 N. C. 187,
55 S. E. 95 (1906), the final collecting bank, for the purposes of the discussion,
will bear the liability for loss due to non-payment of a check. For a dis-
cussion of the rule see note (1924) 13 CAL. L. Rxv. 231. See infra note 27.
'Davidson v. Allen, 276 Pac. 43 (Idaho 1929); Baldwin's Bank v. Smith,
215 N. Y. 76, 109 N. E. 138, L. R. A. 1918 F 1089. But see Litchfield v. Reid,
195 N. C. 161, 141 S. E. 543 (1928) discussed in note (1928) 6 N. C. L. Rv.
466. From a review of the cases it would, appear that under the noted situ-
ation the check is deemed paid only insofar as is necessary to hold the drawee
liable by reason of his acceptance. Ill. Trust and Say. Bank v. Northern Bank
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debt of the drawee to the drawer is at that time discharged and the
bank becomes the debtor of the payee. A drawer is also held to be
discharged when a collecting bank accepts from a drawee bank, a
draft in payment of a check forwarded by it for collection, even
though such acceptance be unauthorized; upon the ground that the
drawer, when he issues a check engages that it will be paid in money
if duly presented, and acceptance of anything else is at the payee's
risk.6 The drawer assumes the risk of loss due to the drawee's de-
fault while the check is in the ordinary course of collection but the
duration of his risk must not be extended without his consent. So,
a drawer may be discharged from liability when the loss is the result
of circuitous routing or delay in forwarding by an intermediate col-
lecting bank, or by any acts which extend his liability beyond the
time generally necessary to present a check and receive payment.7
Have these rules been changed by the statute permitting payment
in exchange drawn on reserve deposits? It was held by the Federal
Court in Cleve v. Craven Chemical Co.,S a case which squarely pre-
sented the question herein discussed, that the drawer was not dis-
charged; that since the drawer had not specified upon the check that
it be paid in cash, he impliedly agreed that, if the check should be
presented by or through a Federal Reserve bank, the drawee might
pay by exchange draft. So it would seem to follow that since the
drawer's discharge was formerly due to the acceptance of a draft
when money could have been demanded,9 he should now be held to
have consented to an extension of the period of his liability occa-
sioned by the acceptance of an exchange draft in payment of the
check.10
and Trust Co., 292 Ill. 11, 126 N. E. 533 (1920). Quaere, however, whether a
check would be paid so as to discharge the drawer when drawee made no re-
mittance. Nineteenth Ward Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 184 Mass. 49, 67 N. E.
670 (1903) ; or when drawee revokes payment after finding drawer had insuf-
ficient funds. Southern Stove Works v. Converse Say. Bank, 112 S. C. 230,
100 S. E. 75 (1919). See also Boatwright v. Rankin, 150 S. C. 374, 148 S. E.
214 (1929), to be discussed in a later issue.
'Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U. S. 160, 44 S. Ct. 296, 68 L. Ed.
617, 31 A. L. R. 1261 (1924) ; Jensen v. Laurel Meat Co., 71 Mont. 582, 2.30
Pac. 1081 (1924).
'N. I. L., §186; Sinclair Refining Co. v. Keith, 98 Okla. 55, 221 Pac. 1003
(1923); McEwen Bros. v. Cobb, 104 Misc. Rep. 477, 172 N. Y. Supp. 44
(1918) ; but see Empire-Arizona Copper Co. v. Shaw, 20 Ariz. 471, 181 Pac.
464, 4 A. L. R. 1229 and note (1917).8 Cleve v. Craven Chemical Co., 18 F. (2d) 711, 52 A. L. R. 980 (C. C. A.,
4th, 1927).
'Infra note 22.
"'Tarasek v. Kosciuszko Bldg. and Loan Assn., 218 Ill. App. 484 (1921),
holding drawer not discharged by delay in presentation when such delay is in-
duced by the drawer's request.
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There is appealing force in the argument, especially since the
apparent effect of the holding is to further protect the payee. As a
matter of fact, it is the drawer who has chosen the bank on which
the check is drawn and which he has trusted with his money. The
payee generally knows nothing of the bank and in taking the check
for value places his confidence in the drawer rather than the bank.
One is less likely to accept the check of a stranger drawn upon the
strongest bank in the country than that of a known responsible
drawer, upon a bank known to be weak.
The North Carolina court, however, upon facts identical with
those in the case referred to above, held that the drawer was dis-
charged; that since the statute was in derogation of the common-law
it should not be extended by implication in that direction further
than indicated by its terms. The expressed purpose of the statute
discloses no intention to deal with the rights and liabilities of the
parties to an instrument. It was also urged that the choice of the
agency for presentation rests with the payee11 and that his selection
of a Federal Reserve bank carried with it the authorization to accept
an exchange draft in payment.
It is submitted that the result reached by the North Carolina court
is practically more desirable.12 First, to hold the drawer liable neces-
sitates an extension of the law merchant to a point it did not previ-
ously reach in order to meet a situation arising unexpectedly from
the operation of the statute. Actually the practice here condoned is
merely what has been the overwhelmingly common usage and custom
for a long time, namely, the payment of collection items by drafts.' 3
'Theoretically it may be said that the choice does rest with the payee. He
may send a messenger and have it collected over the counter, but when his
depository bank is once engaged to collect the item, the payee has neither
choice nor knowledge as to its presentation.
'Apparently this suggestion has been elsewhere controverted. Jensen v.
Laurel Meat Co., supra note 6, held the drawer discharged as in the principal
case. In immediate repudiation of such result the Montana legislature passed
an act holding the drawer liable, but failing to state for what length of time.
Mont. Laws (1925), Ch. 65, S. B. 57. See note (1929) 4 WASH. L. Rav. 39.
Wyoming in 1923 passed an act holding the "maker" liable until final actual
payment to the collecting bank. Wyo. Laws (1923), Ch. 84, p. 1 and 2, which
right of action arising would normally become that of the payee's by subroga-
tion. Graham v. Warehouse, 189 N. C. 533, 127 S. E. 540 (1925). In 1925
an entirely new banking law was enacted, Wyo. Laws (1925), Ch. 157, §47,
from which the above maker's liability clause was omitted. It was again rein-
stated, however. Wyo. Laws (1927), Ch. 100, §47.
" See LANGSTON AND WHITNEY, BANKING PRACTICE (1921), pp. 102-3; 1
KNIrrIN, COMMEaCAL BANKING (1923), pp. 374-76; Noble v. Doughten, 72
Kan. 336, 83 Pac. 1048, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1167 (1905) ; note (1924) 24 CoL.
L. REv. 903.
NOTES
Secondly, if the drawer's liability is to be extended to protect the
payee in the case discussed, at what point in the course of collection
shall we discharge the drawer and hold that the check is paid? Cer-
tainly we cannot hold him until actual cash is finally received by the
payee or his depository bank. Under the credit basis of modem
banking his liability might be extended over an indefinite and often
unreasonable period.14 In truth, in the majority of banking transac-
tions money is never transferred at all. Shall we hold him until the
collecting bank has had an opportunity of accepting something in
payment of the remitted exchange draft? Such solution would afford
the payee little or no protection that he does not now have and would
not justify the promulgation of a rule, rather arbitrary in legal con-
templation and probably attended by the addition of a few more
parties to collection controversies.
Lastly, since North Carolina now has a statute' 5 giving the payee
a preference in the assets of the insolvent drawee it is quite probable
that a claim against the drawee is of more value than one against a
drawer who refuses to pay a debt, which, to speak as a layman, is
not actually paid. It is almost unheard of, that an insolvent bank
does not have sufficient funds to pay its preferred claims. By filing a
claim with the receivers a payee would be assured of payment within
a much shorter time than that required for a suit against the drawer.
(2) As to the payee's rights against the collecting bank.
The question presented in the Braswell case16 is whether or not,
under the statute, the collecting bank is relieved of the liability it
formerly had, for accepting a bank draft in payment of a check for-
warded by it for collection, when such draft is not paid upon pres-
entation.
An agent is liable to his principal, in the absence of an agreement
to the contrary, for the loss occasioned by his acceptance of anything
other than money in payment of a check.17 And this rule applies to
collecting banks.18 It is based upon the assumption that a check is
14 SPAHR, CLEARING AND COLLECTION OF CHECKS (1926), pp. 189, 462 et seq.
"N. C. Code (1927), §218 (c), subs. 14.
'"Supra note 3.
1 MECEEm, AGENCY (2d ed., 1914), §946.
Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, supra note 6; Jensen v. Laurel Meat
Co., supra note 6; but see Bank of Memphis v. Bank of Clarendon, 63 Tex.
Civ. App. 469, 134 S. W. 831 (1911) where collecting bank is held justified in
accepting exchange draft in payment by reason of prevailing custom and usage.
State v. Tyler County State Bank, 277 S. W. 625, 627, 42 A. L. R. 1347 and
note (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). For discussion of custom and usage as affecting
collecting bank's liability see note (1924) 24 COL. L. REV. 903.
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payable in cash and the agent accepts payment in any other medium
at his own risk.
In the Braswell case19 Connor, J., says that the payee must be
held to have authorized acceptance of a draft since he must have
known that the collecting bank would avail itself of the postoffice as
a means by which presentment would be made.20 Therefore the
payee cannot hold the bank liable. It has been held that the North
Carolina statute does not change the rule that a check is payable only
in cash.2 1 Why should it not then follow that the collecting bank is
authorized to present the check only in such manner as will enable it
to demand cash ?22 A strong argument advanced in Morris v. Cleve23
is that statutes in derogation of the common-law must be strictly con-
strued under the limitation that the legislature will be presumed not
to intend innovations upon the common-law, further than is indicated
by their express terms. In the case of the Federal Reserve Bank v.
Malloy,24 where the plaintiff contended that a statute permitting for-
warding direct to the drawee, also by implication carries with it the
" Supra note 3.
" Infra note 22.
' Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, supra note 1;
see Dewey v. Margolis, infra note 22.
" In an admirable brief of the plaintiff appellant in the Braswell case it was
forcefully argued that the statute permitting payment by draft was inapplicable.
The check in that case had not been routed through the Federal Reserve Bank
but had been sent by mail direct to the drawee by the collecting bank. The
contention was that there was no presentment by the postoffice. Where a check
is mailed direct to the drawee, it is held that the drawee is the agent for the
purpose of presenting to itself. Smith v. Mitchell, 117 Ga. 772, 45 S. E. 47;
note (1927) 52 A. L. R. 1001. It is obvious therefore that the court reached
its result by construing this as presentment, "through" the postoflice. It must
be admitted that the word "through" in the statute was not merely repetitious
but was actually intended. Otherwise the Federal Reserve might have avoided
the statute by forwarding items to another bank with instructions to present
over the counter and demand cash. Since North Carolina follows the "Massa-
chusetts rule" the presenting bank would be the agent of the payee to present
and not of the prior bank in the chain of collection, and the above transaction
would not be included in the phrase, "or any respective agent thereof." But
if the foregoing is true it must follow that a check comes within the operation
of the statute if it at any time in the course of collection comes into the hands
of the postoffice. That such result was not intended by the legislature cannot
be -denied. See Dewey v. Margolis, 195 N. C. 307, 311, 142 S. E. 22 (1928),
where when a check was presented as in the Braswell case, the court says, "It
('the collecting bank) had the right to demand that the check of the defend-
ants be paid in money. It waived this right at its own risk and not at the risk
of the defendants." See also Quarles v. Taylor, 195 N. C. 313, 142 S. E. 25
(1928) ; Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U S.
649, 658, 659, supra note 1.
' Supra note 3.
' Supra note 6.
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authority to accept a draft in payment, the court said, "But to justify
an extension by implication of the terms of the regulation, it must
be made to appear at least that the addition sought to be annexed is
a necessary means to carry into effect the authority expressly given
by the regulation." Accordingly, the inquiry becomes, does a statute
authorizing the drawee to pay checks by exchange drafts in certain
instances, carry with it the authority for a collecting bank to take
such a course of collection as will force it to accept such payment?
It is submitted that it does not unless all possible methods of
presentment come within the operation of the statute.25  In view of
the present turbid state of the laws pertaining to bank collections,
the result of the varied constructions and interpretations advanced in
the clash between statutory enactments and the law merchant, it would
probably be wise to leave it to the legislature2 6 to provide for the
result reached in the instant case. 27  HARRY RocxwELL.
'It is said that if two or more courses of collection are open to a collect-
ing bank, one of which may prove damaging to the payee, the bank is liable if
4damage does result frompursuing that course. Federal Land Bank v. Barrow,
189 N. C. 303, 309, 127, S. E. 3, 6 (1925). But see supra note 22. Apparently
the only course of collection open not affected by the statute is to send the
check by a personal agent, a practice so obviously inconceivable as to be
humorous. The net effect of the deductions referred to is to make checks
drawn on banks in this state non-negotiable by reason of their being payable
in something other than cash. It may be argued that since it is still possible
at all events to require payment in cash that negotiability has not been destroyed.
Yet the doctrine of negotiability is a child of the law merchant which has as
its foundation the practices of the commercial world. It cannot therefore be
defined in terms foreign to commercial practice. See Note (1923) 33 YALE
L. J. 752, 759, fn. 23.
"The American Banker's Association's proposed Bank Collection Code has
now been adopted in the following states: Ind. Acts (1929), Ch. 164; Md.
Laws (1929), Ch ....... ; Mo. Laws (1929), p. 205; Neb. Laws (1929), Ch. 41;
N. J. Laws (1929), Ch ....... ; N. M. Laws (1929), Ch. 138; N. Y. Laws (1929),
Ch. 589; Wash. Laws (1929), Ch ....... ; Wis. Laws (1929), Ch ........
One of the interesting changes effected by the Act is to introduce the
"'Massachusetts rule" into New Jersey, New York, New Mexico and Wiscon-
sin, states which formerly followed the "New York rule" of collecting bank
liability.
(a) §350 (f) of the N. Y. statute reads: "When an item is received by mail
by a solvent drawee or payor bank it shall be deemed paid when the amount
is finally charged to the account of the maker or drawer." §350 1 (2) contains:
"... after having charged such item to the account of the maker or drawer
thereof or otherwise discharged his liability thereon ... ." Yet Mr. Brady,
editor of the BANKING LAW JOURNAL, observes that in a case such as is dis-
cussed in the text the drawer remains liable, under §350 j. See (1929) 46 B. L.
J. 755. The Code as adopted by Missouri does not have a section corresponding
to §350 f of the N. Y. statute. The Committee on Uniform Act on Collection
by Banks are at work on a Bank Collection Act which it is hoped will remedy
the deficiencies of the Bankers Association Code.
"
1 The effect of a contrary decision had it been reached in the Braswell case
would immediately have been avoided by banks by the use of deposit slip
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FEDERAL INJUNCTION AGAINST DISCRIMINATORY STATE TAX
Theoretically, in the absence of statute, injunctive relief against
an illegal or invalid tax is obtainable when the case can be shown
to lie clearly within one of the recognized branches of equity juris-
diction, 1 such as avoidance of multiplicity of suits,2 removal of cloud
on title,3 or prevention of irreparable injury.4 Actually, however,
for cogent reasons of public policy derived from a supposed neces-
sity for uninterrupted revenues, supported by restrictive legislation,
equitable relief against taxes, is in most jurisdictions, either limited
or denied.5
Thus, injunction against federal tax is practically eliminated by
Rev. Stat. 3224.6 In only the most "extraordinary and exceptional
circumstances" have the provisions of the section been held inappli-
cable,7 and in only one situation-distraint during the pendency of
an appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals-is there any statutory recog-
nition of injunction.8
contracts with their customers. It may be suggested that payees, especially
merchants and credit organizations who receive a considerable number of
checks might likewise protect themselves by contracts with the debtors that
checks tendered in payment are taken subject to final receipt of cash or solvent
credits thereon.
'37 Cyc. 1258; 4 CoOLaY, TAXATIoN (4th ed. 1924), §1641; (1894), 22
L. R. A. 700. See Dowes v. Chicago, 11 Wall. 108, 20 L. ed. 65 (1870). For
helpful notes on injunction as remedy for unlawful taxation see: (1924) 22
MICH. L. R. 594; (1910) 10 COL. L. REv. 564.
'Raymond v. Chicago Union T. Co., 207 U. S. 20, 28 Sup. Ct. 7, 52 L. ed.
78, 12 Ann. Cas. 757 (1907) ; Porto Rico Tax Appeals, 16 F. (2d) 545 (C. C.
A. 1st, 1926); Fairley v. Duluth, 150 Minn. 374, 185 N. W. 390, 32 A. L. R.
1258 (1924); (1870) 22 L. R. A. 703; COOLEY, s-upra note 1, §1642.
'Ogden City v. Armstrong, 168 U. S. 224, 18 S. Ct. 98, 42 L. ed. 444 (1897) ;
Note (1891) 10 L. R. A. 293; COOLEY, supra note 1, §1643.
Southern Ry. Co. v. Asheville, 69 F. 359 (C. C., W. D., N. C., 1895);
Odlin v. Woodruff, 31 Fla. 160, 12 So. 227, 22 L. R. A. 699 (1893).
'4 POMEROY, EQuITY JURIsPRUDENcE (4th ed. 1919), §§1779-81; 37 Cyc.
1257; (1928) 26 MICH. L. R. 922.6 Comp. Stat. 5947, 26 U. S. C. A. 154. Statute does not prevent injunction
against collection of a penalty. Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U. S. 557, 66 L. ed. 1061,
noted: (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 761. Stockholder may maintain suit to restrain a
corporation from voluntarily paying a tax. Brushaber v. Union Pac. Ry. Co.,
240 U. S. 1, 60 L. ed. 493 (1916); Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U. S.
103, 60 L. ed. 493 (1916).
'Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 66 L. ed. 822 (1922); Dodge v. Brady, 240
U. S. 122, 60 L. ed. 560 (1916).
Illegality of the tax will not take a case out of the statute. Snyder v.
Marks, 109 U. S. 189, 27 L. ed. 801 (1883) ; Bailey v. George, 259 U. S. 16, 60
L. ed. 818 (1922). On the same day that it refused an injunction in Bailey v.
George, the court held in the Child Labor Cases, 259 U. S. 20, 66 L. ed. 818(1922), that the "tax" in question was a penalty and unconstitutional, and a
few days later it granted an injunction against the collection of a penalty l
Lipke v. Lederer, supra note 6.
' Sec. 272 (a) Rev. Act 1928; 26 U. S. C. A. 1048. Peerless Mills v. Rose,
28 F. (2nd) 661 (C. C. A. 5th, 1928). See: (1926) 26 COL. L. Rzv. 493,
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Many states, including North Carolina, by statute, permit tax
injunctions but limit this relief to cases involving an illegal or in-
valid tax.9 This does not mean, however, that the court will restrain
a tax simply because it is irregular, erroneous or excessive.10 An
illegality resulting from the violation of some fundamental law is
required.11 Thus, relief was granted when the tax was levied under
an unconstitutional statute, 12 when the tax was for an unlawful pnr-
pose, 18 and when the levy was vitiated by fraud.14
A systematic and intentional adoption of any principle of valu-
ation contrary to the constitutional requirements of equality and uni-
formity is dearly discriminatory and is a basis for injunction. 15
Hence, relief has been granted when there was undervaluation of
other taxable property in same class with complainant's ;16 where cor-
porate holdings were assessed at full value according to law while
valuation of non-corporate items were illegally fixed lower ;17 where
different classes of property were assessed at different percentages
' N. C. Code (1927) 858, 7979; Hunt v. Cooper, 194 N. C. 265, 267, 139 S. E.
446 (1927); Ry. v. Commissioners, 188 N. C. 265, 266, 124 S. E. 560 (1924).
PomEaoy, supra note 5, par. 1781, cases collected by states.
"Wilson v. Green, 135 N. C. 343, 47 S. E. 469 (1904); McDonald v.
Teague, 119 N. C. 604, 26 S. E. 158 (1896); City. Ry. Co. v. Beard, 293 F.
448 (S. D. Ohio, 1923); Sou. Ry. v. Watts, 260 U. S. 519, 67 L. ed. 375
(1923); Fordson Coal Co. v. Moore, 31 F. (2nd) 606 (E. D. Ky. 1929);
Chicago etc. Ry. v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94, 45 S. Ct. 55, 69 L. ed. 183 (1924).
' Tax assessed at higher rate than allowed by city charter may be enjoined.
Colquit etc. Co. v. Colquit, 146 Ga. 519, 91 S. E. 555 (1917). But tax is not
illegal because the sidewalks of the taxing municipality were not of width
prescribed by charter. Soniat v. White, 155 La. 290, 99 So. 223 (1924). 37
Cyc. 1259. 4
"Purnelle v. Page, 133 N. C. 125, 45 S. E. 534 (1903), state tax on salary
of Federal Judge; Koonce v. Pierce Petroleum Corp., 3 S. W. (2d.) 9 (Ark.
1928), unauthorized franchise tax; Greene v. Louisville etc. Co., 244 U. S.
499, 61 L. ed. 1280, Ann. Cas. 1917 E. 88 (1917).
"' Rigsbee v. Durham, 94 N. C. 800 (1886); Richardson v. Kildow, 218 N.
W. 429 (Neb. 1928), noted: (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 122; Kan. City Sou. Ry. v.
Hendricks, 150 La. 134, 90 So. 545 (1922).
'Johnson v. Wells Fargo & Co., 239 U. S. 234, 36 Sup. Ct. 62, 60 L. ed.
243, L. R. A. 1916 C. 522 (1915); Raymond v. Traction Co., supra note 2;
COOLLY, supra note 1, §1645.
'Bohler v. Calloway, 267 U. S. 479, 45 S. Ct. 431, 69 L. ed. 746 (1925);
Gammil Lumber Co. v. Board, 274 Fed. 630 (S. D. Miss., 1921); Elgin v.
Hessen, 282 Fed. 281 (D. C. Tenn., 1921) ; Chicago etc. Ry. v. Eveland, 13 F.
(2nd) 442 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) ; G. W. Ry. v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94, 98, 45 S.
Ct. 55, 57, 69 L. ed. 183 (1924).
"'Mayor et als. v. N. Y. Bay Ry. Co., 13 F. (2d) 982 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1926);
Bank of Ariz. v. Howe, 293 Fed. 600 (D. C. Ariz., 1923) ; Sunday Lake Iron
Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 352, 38 S. Ct. 495, 62 L. ed. 1155 (1918).
' Boonville Nat. Bank v. Schlotzhauer, 298 S. W. 732, 55 A. L. R. 489 (Mo.
1927); Magnolia Bank v. Bd. Supervisions, 111 Miss. 857, 72 So. 697, 55
A. L. R. 1365 (1916).
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of value, contrary to law ;18 and where complainant's property was
so exorbitantly valued as to amount to spoliation.19 However, there
must be clear and convincing proof of intentional and systematic
discrimination,2 0 and injunctive relief has been refused when the
assessment was due to error,2 ' or to mistakes of judgment.22
Many cases involving injunction against discriminatory taxes are
carried into the Federal Courts on the grounds of violation of the
due process and equal protection clauses of the constitution. 28 Once
having obtained jurisdiction, the power of the United States courts
to grant equitable relief against an illegal state tax is limited only
by the provision of the Judicial Code24 concerning the adequacy of
the remedy on the law side of the court.25
It is interesting in this connection to note that two recent Fed-
eral cases, one from North Carolina 26 and one from Ohio27 appar-
ently reach opposite results. In each case the complainant alleged
that its own property had been assessed at, or above, its proper value
while the property of others had been systematically and intention-
ally assessed at less than actual value. In both states, injunction
against illegal tax is recognized by statute,28 and in each an action
at law may be brought for recovery of tax paid under protest.21
"
3Chi. etc. Ry. v. Osborne, 265 U. S. 14, 44 S. Ct. 431, 68 L. ed. 878
(1924) ; Mobile & 0. Ry. Co. v. Schnipper, 31 F. (2d) 587 (E. D., Ill., 1929) ;
Chi. M. & St. P. Ry. v. Kendall, 278 Fed. 298 (S. D. Iowa, 1921). But see
(1910) 3 COL. L. REV. 298.
"Nevada-California Power Co. v. Hamilton, 240 Fed. 485 (D. C. Nevada,
1917) ; Sanford v. Roberts, 193 Ky. 377, 236 S. W. 571 (1922) ; City of Sweet-
water v. Baird Devel. Co., 203 S. W. 801 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
'Taylor v. L. & N. Ry. Co., 88 Fed. 350, 373 (C. C. A. 6th, 1898) ; Louis-
ville Trust Co. V. Stone, 107 Fed. 305, 308 (C. C. A. 6th, 1901) ; Chi. Ry. Co.
v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94, 45 S. Ct. 55, 69 L. ed. 183 (1924). And as a
necessary condition precedent to equitable relief, the complainant must pay the
amount of the tax he would have to pay if the discrimination did not exist.
Raymond v. T. Co., supra note 2; PomEaoy, supra note 5, §1784.
' Siler v. Bd., 221 Ky. 100, 298 S. W. 189 (1927), noted: (1928) 16 Ky.
L. J. 275.
'Harrison v. Ry., 142 Ark. 118, 218 S. W. 208 (1920).
'See Powell, Due Process Tests of State Taxation (1926) 74 U. PA. L.
REv. 423, 573.
2§267, 28 U. S. C. A. 384.
'Federal Courts in the exercise of equity jurisdiction not bound by state
statute prohibiting tax injunction: Standard Oil Co. v. Howe, 257 Fed. 481
(C. C. A. 9th, 1919) ; Ex parte Tyler, 149 U. S. 164, 188, 37 L. ed. 689 (1893).
'Henrietta Mills Co. v. Rutherford County, 32 F. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 4th,
1929).
Conn v. Ringer, 32 F. (2d.) 639 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929).
"North Carolina: N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §858; Ohio: Gen. Code
§12075.
" North Carolina: N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §7979; Ohio: Gen. Code
§12075.
NOTES
Held: in the North Carolina case, adequate remedy at law, no relief;
in the Ohio case, adequacy of the legal remedy doubtful, injunction
granted.
The two cases are, however, distinguishable along these lines:
(1) In the Ohio case, the complainants were trustees of a charitable
trust, the disruption of whose functions perhaps affected the public
interest sufficiently to counterbalance the state's interest in the cer-
tainty of collection of taxes; in the North Carolina case, the com-
plainant was a manufacturing company. (2) In the Ohio case, the
discrimination alleged was between real property assessments on the
one hand and those of personal property on the other, each class con-
cededly being treated uniformly within itself; in the North Carolina
case, the allegation was that as to the same class of property, com-
plainant was assessed at a figure in excess of its property's true
value, while the assessed value of others' was fixed at 60 per cent
of its true value. (3) In the Ohio case, the tax commission, at plain-
tiff's request alone, could not remedy the situation; in the North
Carolina case, a similar administrative agency had actually lowered
plaintiff's assessment somewhat. (4) The court in the Ohio case was
not concerned with the adequacy of a suit to recover taxes paid under
protest but with the efficacies of an untaken appeal to the tax com-
mission to cause personal property to share its burden of taxes so as
to prevent such burdensome taxes on realty; the court in the North
Carolina case was wholly concerned with the adequacy, under the
North Carolina statute, of a possible suit on the law side of the
Federal Court to recover taxes to be paid under protest.
Even so, the view of the Federal Court in North Carolina seems
unnecessarily restrictive. It felt that a Federal Court should be
cautious about enjoining the collection of a state tax. The Ohio
court expressed no such hesitancy, however, and, as the cases cited
in the note8 0 indicate, this caution has frequently yielded o the de-
mands of meritorious facts. Moreover, the Federal law court, if
and when it gets the case, will, if the allegations are found true, in-
terfere by its judgment to as great an extent with the fiscal oper-
ations of the state. Perhaps, however, although the case was con-
sidered on the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint, the
"Accord: Cummings v. Nat. Bank, 101 U. S. 153, 25 L. ed' 903 (1879) ;
Western Union v. Tax Com, 21 F. (2d) 355 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927) ; Dawson v.
Distilleries etc. Co., 255 U. S. 288, 65 L. ed. 638 (1920) ; Gammil Lumber Co.,
supra note 15; State Bd. v. Ry., 191 Ind. 282, 130 N. E. 691 (1921) ; Paxton
v. Ohio Fuel Co., 11 F. (2d) 740 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926).
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court was unconsciously influenced by the fact that the District Court
had expressly found that no discrimination of the sort alleged actu-
ally existed.
If discrimination between the assessment of real and personal
property was enough in the Ohio case, is not the alleged discrimina-
tion between assessments of properties in the same class more de-
serving of equitable relief ?31 Moreover, the exception in the North
Carolina statute, in favor of injunctive relief against illegal taxes,
creates no greater right to that relief than exists in jurisdictions with-
out any such statute.32 The view that this statute, by virtue of that
exception, operates to increase the remedies available in the Federal
Equity Court and must therefore be ignored, is perhaps derived from
the court's willingness to make the same statute, insofar as it author-
izes suits to recover taxes paid under protest, the affirmative basis
of a proceeding on the law side of the same tribunal.
Finally, even if a recovery at law of the difference between the tax
on a legal assessment and the actual amount of the tax paid under
protest, with interest, will theoretically make the complainant whole,
and even if this decision would be res judicata: as to subsequent levies
pending the next quadrennial assessment (which might be doubted in
view of the technical change in the issues and subject matter from
year to year) the relief to be awarded at law can take no notice of
the jeopardizing of the complainant's financial structure incident to
the loss of those funds during the period of suit. A jury could not
deal intelligently with the issue to be presented at law; a judge sitting
alone will have to handle the task that a court consisting of three
judges in the instant case refused to attempt. It is not believed that
the remedy at lav is adequate.
The North Carolina case is now before the Supreme Court of the
United States on a writ of certiorari. THOMAS W. SPRINKLE.
TITLE TO CORPORATE PROPERTY UPON DISSOLUTION
Smith v. Dicks' presents a question as to property rights of stock-
holders where, without knowledge on the part of the corporate mem-
' See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Tax. Com., stpra note 30.
" See notes 1 to 5 supra. The court examined the state supreme court's con-
struction of the statute and found it difficult to determine precisely when in-junction against illegal taxes would be granted. It assumed, however, that the
state court would have granted that relief in the case at bar. Herietta Mills
Co. v. Rutherford County, supra note 26, at p. 573.
± 197 N. C. 355, 148 S. E. 463 (1929).
NOTES
bers, the charter had expired by limitation and operations had been
continued thereafter for seven years, without any move for winding
up as provided for by statute. It was held that upon expiration of
the charter, the only outstanding indebtedness being a mortgage, the
members became tenants in common of an undivided interest in fee,
subject to the mortgage indebtedness, with power of conveyance ac-
cordingly on the part of any member.
Upon the expiration or revocation of a corporate charter with
resultant dissolution, all jurisdictions in dealing with the assets, in
the final analysis, reach the same practical result-payment of cor-
porate debts with distribution of any residue among the stockholders.
But in the matter of defining stockholders' rights, and the situs of
title, in the corporate assets during the period of dissolution, opinions
are both confusing and conflicting.2  Decisions may be roughly
grouped under three heads.
Under the so-called "trust-fund" doctrine8 the assets of a dis-
solved corporation constitute a trust fund for the primary benefit
of creditors, with distribution of the residue among the stockholders.
Legal title to the property vests in the trustees4 who are provided for
by statute5 or appointed by the court,6 the shareholders having only
an equitable interest.7 An invention of the courts of equity whereby
to defeat the old common law rules of reverter and escheat,8 the
"trust-fund" doctrine has been continued in modern times by decis-
'See 8 THompsox, CoRPoRAToNs (3rd ed.), §§6505-6523; BALLANTINE,
CoRPoRATIoNs (1927), §267; note (1927) 47 A. L. R. 1288.
'McWilliams v. Excelsior Coal Co., 298 Fed. 884 (C. C. A. 8th. 1924);
Burke v. Wall, 29 La. Anno. 38, 29 Am. Rep. 316 (1877); Roman Catholic
Church v. Texas & P. R. Co., 41 Fed. 564 (C. C. E. D. La. 1890) ; New York
B. & E. R. Co. v. Motil, 81 Conn. 466, 71 Atl. 563 (1908); note (1927) 47
A. L. R. 1288; (1921) 35 HARv. L. Rxv. 58; (1916) 29 HARv. L. REv. 780.
'Aalwyns Law Institute v. Martin, 173 Cal. 21, 159 Pac. 158 (1916) ; Rose-
boom v. Warner, 132 Il1. 81, 23 N. E. 339 (1890); Neptune Fire Engine &
Hose Co. v. Board of Education, 166 Ky. 1, 178 S. W. 1138 (1915); Thomas
v. Rogers, 191 N. C. 736, 133 S. E. 18 (1926); In re Friedman, 164 N. Y.
Supp. 892, 177 App. Div. 755 (1917).
"'Young v. Fitch, 182 Ky. 29, 206 S. W. 29 (1918) ; N. C. Con. Stat. Ann.(1919), §1194.
'Bacon v. Robertson, supra note 3; N. C. Con. Stat. Ann. (1919), §1194.
SMorman Church v. United States, 136 U. S. 1, 34 L. Ed. 478 (1889);
Richards v. Attleboro Nat. Bank, 148 Mass. 187, 19 N. E. 353, 1 L. R. A. 781(1889) ; Muir v Citizens Nat. Bank, 39 Wash. 57, 80 Pac. 1007 (1905), holding
that an assignment or transfer of stock by a stockholder after the dissolution
of a corporation is merely an equitable assignment of his interests in the assets
of the concern as it may appear upon the settlement.
'For cases dealing with the doctrines of reverter and escheat see: Neptune
Fire Engine & Hose Co. v. Board of Education, supra note 4; Wilson v. Leary,
120 N. C. 90, 26 S. E. 30 (1897) ; Note (1927) 47 A. L. R. 1288, 1334.
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ions and statutes. Under the statutes in many states provision is
made for a period in which to wind up the corporate affairs, 9 with
stipulations for the corporate officers to act as trustees,' 0 or for
appointment of receivers,"' or for the corporation itself to act as
trustee.
12
Another view, although protecting the rights of creditors under a
trust, presents a hybrid situation so far as the interests of the stock-
holders are concerned, wherein the interests of stockholders are equit-
able, and legal title is in the trustees until debts are paid; legal title
in the residue thereafter vesting in the stockholders as tenants in com-
mon.13 North Carolina comes under this grouping by virtue of con-
struction of statutes and decisions; statutes provide for a three year
period of dissolution during which in the absence of court action, the
directors are trustees ;14 decisions hold that the assets of a dead cor-
poration constitute a trust fund ;15 and the principal case 16 holds that
in the absence of corporate debts and active dissolution proceedings,
the stockholders become tenants in common.
Still other decisions bring forward the doctrine that when the
corporate existence ceases the stockholders become vested with a
legal title to its property as tenants in common, subject, of course, to
"Refer to statutes of particular states. For North Carolina see N. C. Con.
Stat. Ann. (1919), §1193, providing a 3 year period; Buckley v. Anderson et al,
137 Ala. 325, 34 So. 238 (1903) ; Sullivan Timber Co. v. Black, 159 Ala. 570,
48 So. 870 (1909) ; Boston Towboat Co. v. Medford Nat. Bank, 228 Mass. 484,
117 N. E. 928 (1917) ; Knott v. Evening Post Co., 124 Fed. 342 (C. C. W. D. Ky.
1903) ; (1928) 17 Ky. L. J. 54, pointing out that property held by corporation
before dissolution vests in stockholders subject to corporate liabilities; and in
interpreting the Kentucky statute authorizing a corporation to close up its
affairs on expiration of charter, it was held that no specific mode was de-
scribed, nor was one at all desirable.
"Thomas v. Rogers, 191 N. C. 736, 133 S. E. 18 (1926) ; In re Friedman,
supra note 4; Loudermilk v. Butlert, 182 N. C. 502, 109 S. E. 571 (1921).
Refer to statutes of particular states: Bucklet v. Anderson, supra note 9; Sul-
livan Timber Co. v. Black, supra note 9.
'Refer to statutes of particular states: State v. New Orleans Debenture
Redemption Co., 107 La. 562, 32 So. 102 (1902).
McBride v. Murphy, 124 Atl. 198 (Del. Ch. 1924) ; also refer to statutes
of particular states.
' Baldwin v. Johnson, 95 Tex. 85, 65 S. W. 181 (1901); Capuccio v. Caire,
189 Cal. 154, 209 Pac. 367 (1922).
" N. C. Con. Stat. Ann. (1919), §1194.
"Heggie v. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 107 N. C. 581, 12 S. E. 275 (1890); Mer-
chants Nat. Bank of Richmond v. Newton Cotton Mills, 115 N. C. 507, 20 S. E.
765 (1894) ; Holshouser v. Copper Co., 138 N. C. 248, 50 S. E. 650 (1905) ;
Hill v. Lumber Co., 113 N. C. 174, 18 S. E. 107 (1893) ; Loudermilk v. Butlert,
182 N. C. 502, 109 S. E. 571 (1921).
" Smith v. Dicks, supra note 1.
NOTES
corporate debts. 17 In accepting this view some courts lay down
varying limitations in that the title is held to vest in the stockholders
as tenants in common on conditions that no receiver is appointed,18 or
there is no insolvency,19 or creditors,20 or that the property will be
subject to a "trust" for the benefit of creditors. 21 Still another holds
that, even though the debts have already been extinguished, title vests
in the stockholders only at the end of the statutory period for winding
up.22 A few courts hold that title vests in the stockholders as a part-
nership,23 while others use the terms "tenants in common" and "part-
nership" interchangeably. 24
By drawing an analogy to the situation upon the death intestate
of a natural person, one court25 holds that even though a trustee be
appointed he would not hold the legal title to the property, but would
only be the custodian of the court with power of disposition, for the
purpose of paying debts and of distribution, his right being similar
to that of an administrator, legal title having "descended" to the stock-
holders. On the other hand, even courts firmly adhering to the
"trust-fund" doctrine, or to the tenancy in common theory, draw an
analogy to the situation where a natural person has died intestate.26
In contradistinction to the holdings of decisions previously dis-
cussed, it is submitted that in those states providing for a winding-up
"'Capital Garage Co. v. Powell, 98 Vt. 145, 118 Atl. 524 (1922) ; Meredith
v. Washington Loan & Trust Co., 151 Md. 274, 134 Atl. 206 (1926); Shadoin
v. Sellars, 237 Ky. 751, 4 S. W. (2d) 717 (1928); Young v. Fitch, 181 Ky. 20,
206 S. W. 29 (1918); Taylor v. Interstate Investment Co., 75 Wash. 490, 135
Pac. 240 (1913) ; Montgomery v. Heath, 283 S. W. 324 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
" Cummington Realty Ass'n. v. Whitten, 238 Mass. 313, 132 N. E. 53 (1921) ;
Baldwin v. Johnson, supra note 13; Stone v. Edwards, 32 Ga. 479, 124 S. E.
54 (1924).
Baldwin v. Johnson, supra note 13.
Service & Wright Lumber Co. v. Sumpter Valley Ry. Co., 81 Ore. 32, 158
Pac. 175 (1916) ; Stone v. Edwards, supra note 18.
' Steams Coal & Lumber Co. v. Van Winkle et at, 221 Fed. 590 (E. D. Ky.
1915) ; Pioneer Coal Co. v. Asher, 210 Ky. 498, 276 S. W. 487 (1925).
"Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Van Winkle, supra note 21; Ewald Iron
Co. v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 692, 131 S. W. 774 (1910).
"Ewald Iron Co. v. Commonwealth, supra note 22.
' Mason v. Pewabic Mining Co., 133 U. S. 50, 33 L. ed. 524 (1890).
"Stone v. Edwards, supra note 18; see Service & Wright Lumber Co. v.
Sumter Valley Ry. Co., supra note 20.
"Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Van Winkle, supra note 21; Stone v. Ed-
wards, 32 Ga. 479, 124 S. E. 54, 56, the court observing, "Oddly enough, but
more specifically, the relation of the stockholders to the assets of the dissolved
corporation is still more similar to the relation of a surviving husband or wife
to the real estate of a spouse who died intestate, leaving no lineal decendants";
Von Glahn v. DeRosset, 81 N. C. 472 (1879); Dobson v. Simonton, 86 N. C.
495 (1882) ; Wilson v. Leary, 120 N. C. 90, 26 S. E. 30 (1897).
70 THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
period no actual change of title takes place upon the expiration or
annullment of the corporate charter. The dying process is extended
for a fixed or reasonable period, wherein the corporation, though
nominally dead, still lives for the purpose of liquidation. Title to
property remains in the corporation,27 the same as before its partial
legal death, subject to the winding-up proceedings. During this
period the stockholders are not tenants in common of the corporate
property, but have the same equitable interests as existed before the
charter's expiration. At the end of the period of extended existence,
in the absence of court action creating a receivership or trust, legal
title descends to the stockholders as tenants in common, in exactly
the same manner as title to realty vests in heirs upon death of a
natural person; and concurrence of each individual stockholder would
be necessary to convey his interest. 28 If debts still existed after such
"descent" of title, the property of the former corporation, now vested
in the stockholders as tenants in common, would be liable.
Regardless of which theory is adopted as to the place of title dur-
ing dissolution, the practical results will be the same in that creditors
will always be protected, and a distribution made of any residue. But
it is submitted that the exigencies of modern business demand uni-
formity in the decisions, and the adoption of the simplest and most
practicable theory in order that disposition of interests in dead cor-
porations may be facilitated, and proceedural difficulties avoided.
WALTER HOYLE.
SSee Duchutes Co. v. Lara, 127 Ore. 57, 270 Pac. 913 (1928), that corpor-
ation is capable of serving as repository of title during winding up period. In
Rossi v. Caire, 186 Cal. 544, 199 Pac. 1042 (1921), the court squarely faces
the question of "where is the title?" but refuses to answer, being content with
the statement that whether the interests of the stockholders be legal or equit-
able, it is a vested right which becomes absolute when the statutory trust of
the former directors or trustee of the dead corporation have been fulfilled,
there being no further claim necessitating the right of disposition of corporate
property in the trustees in order to insure satisfaction of creditors.
'See Capuccio v. Caire, 189 Cal. 514, 209 Pac. 367 (1922), that a revived
corporation could become vested with property of former dissolved corporation
only by means ofoeonveyances from all of stockholders of former corporation.
